N. Korea's Stealth Row Boat

I found several photos of a peculiar looking North Korean boat from the website of Yoo Yong-Won, the Chosun Ilbo's defense correspondent. As history has shown, communism and navies just don't go together...

ROKS Yun Yeong-Ha Undergoing Sea Trial

Chamsuri class vessels sailing just off the Korean coastline.

A rather large proportion of the Republic of Korea Navy's (ROKN) coastal patrol duties continue to be the responsibility of Chamsuri class coastal patrol boats whose purpose is most likely to fend off North Korean incursions, as well as sinking them when necessary as was the case during the 1999 and 2002 Yeonpyeong Naval Battles.

However, the ROKN in recent years has been preparing to confront navies of a more sophisticated variety in coastal waters as evident in the Patrol Killer eXperimental (PKX) program. The procurement program has so far resulted in the first Yun Yeong-Ha class vessel, the 570-ton ROKS Yun Yeong-Ha. The class is named after the late Lieutenant Commander Yun Yeong-Ha who died in action during the 2002 altercation with North Korea. In addition to the 40mm and 76mm guns, the design of the new ship shows the incorporation of anti-ship missiles, most likely the Haeseong, or Sea Star missiles, for use against "major" surface combatants. Chamsuri class vessels were solely equipped with 20mm and 40mm guns.

Since last year, ROKS Yun Yeong-Ha has been undergoing sea trial, and a greater number of photos have emerged to enable a closer study of the new vessel. While most photos have been of the ship on drydock, I recently came across on the Korea Defense Network a photo of the water jet-propelled ship undergoing sea trial. The ship is expected to be commissioned into service later this year.

At the very least, it may be safe to conclude 'tis a nice-looking ship.

ROKS Yun Yeong-Ha during sea trial. The anti-ship missiles
are absent in this photo with only the rack in place.

N. Korea Establishes Top Gun School

The latest intelligence report out of North Korea is that the Korean People's Army Navy (KPAN) has been upgrading its naval aviation arm despite economic difficulties, as seen in the video clip below. The juicy bits start at the 1:00 mark. It must be watched with sound, or else the impact will be felt far less.

S. Korea's Growing Naval Ship Export Ambitions

Malaysia's Chief of Defense Force, General Tan Sri Abdul Aziz Zainal, during his visit onboard ROKS Dokdo during the ship's visit to Malaysia in 2007. Malaysia is known to be actively considering the acquisition of at least one Dokdo class vessel.

The South Korean defense industry's global ambitions have been surfacing in recent years. Recent, ongoing and planned research and development (R&D) and "indigenous" procurement programs have often used export potential as one of the primary justifications for their costly pursuit. The platforms South Korea hopes to export include ground vehicles, jet aircraft, rotorcraft and naval vessels.

With regards to naval vessels, rumors have emerged of overseas interest in South Korea's 4,500-ton Chungmugong Yi Sun-Shin class (KDX-II) and 7,500-ton AEGIS-equipped King Sejong the Great class (KDX-III) destroyers, as well as the 14,000-ton Dokdo class (LPX) landing platform dock vessels. Countries rumored to be interested in one or more of the above platforms have been Malaysia, Australia and Turkey. As evident in the Republic of Korea Navy's (ROKN) activities during certain overseas port visits, the ROKN has also been advertising its vessels on behalf of the defense industry to several governments and navies, including those of Vietnam, India and Egypt.

Certainly, South Korea's shipbuilding industry has played a central role in the ROKN's pursuit of a "blue-water" navy, as the ROKN today consists entirely of South Korean-made vessels with the exception of the first Chang Bogo class submarine, ROKS Chang Bogo, which was constructed in the shipyard of Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW) in Kiel, Germany. Since then, South Korean shipyards have so far manufactured 10 German attack submarines -- eight U-209's and two U-214's -- under license from HDW. Seven more U-214's are expected. As for surface vessels, every single one in service today was manufactured by a South Korean shipbuilder, and their orders will in all likelihood grow further over the next decade, as the ROKN pushes ahead with procurement programs for over 20 frigates and even larger number of "next generation" coastal vessels. The total quantities have yet to be confirmed.

While the aforementioned financially-lucrative vessels most likely stand as some of the more sophisticated naval platforms in the world today, South Korea has also been making inroads into smaller markets in less wealthy countries which have acquired second-hand ROKN vessels for prices of around USD 1,000. While practically a give-away, the purpose for doing so has been interpreted as alleviating maintenance costs associated with hardware considered outdated for use by the South Korean military, establishing and strengthening military relations with countries pertinent to South Korea's foreign policy and overseas national interests and to open up potential channels for the future export of first-hand military hardware manufactured by South Korea's growing defense industry. So far, countries which have received second-hand ROKN vessels in recent years have been Bangladesh, Kazakhstan and the Philippines, while negotiations have been ongoing for the transfer of vessels to Cambodia. All vessels included in transactions with the above countries solely involve "small" surface combatants, mostly coastal patrol vessels, or patrol killer (PK) and patrol killer medium (PKM).

While promising potential may exist, South Korea's naval shipbuilding infrastructure has so far churned out only one combat vessel for export, a frigate for Bangladesh in 2001.* This is understandable, as South Korea's history with naval vessels of the more sophisticated architecture began during the 1990's, prior to which the shipbuilding industry spent approximately 15 years developing the necessary manpower and the naval shipbuilding technological base from nearly scratch. In turn, vessels of the aforementioned destroyer and light carrier classes were first launched after 2002. That these vessels are already attracting the attention of aspiring naval powers, many of whom share a common concern in China, is an intriguing development that could provide for a bright future for South Korea's naval ship exports.

For now, a promising indication for the future was hinted in a recent announcement by BAE Systems. BAE announced two months ago that its bidding for an upcoming Royal Navy tanker program will include Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) as a key member of its consortium. DSME's role will be to construct the vessels at its shipyard on Geoje Island. If awarded, DSME will most likely become the first-ever non-British contractor in history to manufacture vessels for the storied Royal Navy. As my naval-minded British friends opined, DSME's key advantage may be that it may deliver the ships on time with little or no cost overruns, aspects of naval ship procurement programs with which the Royal Navy, as well as a number of other wealthy navies, have reportedly become unfamiliar.


* Thanks to Sunho Beck for the correction!

ROKN Training at Sea for Inter-Service Soccer Tournament

Super Lynx landing on a Chungmugong Yi Sun-Shin class destroyer.

One of the most noticeable changes taken place in the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) over the past 20 years has been its three classes of destroyers which were pursued under three separate Korean Destroyer eXperimental (KDX) programs. Today, these destroyers are known as the Gwanggaeto the Great class (KDX-I), Chungmugong Yi Sun-Shin class (KDX-II) and King Sejong the Great class (KDX-III) destroyers.

These destroyers have given the ROKN surface platforms the ability to address in detail targets at all three dimensions of air, surface and underwater. While the likes of vertical missile launchers and the electronic equipment aboard the destroyers indicate drastic improvements from the past, one aspect of the destroyers that has often gone unnoticed has been the helipad.

While to the casual observer a helipad may appear to be a flat piece of mundane real estate shoved to the back of destroyers, its importance is paramount. Indeed, the ROKN operated second-hand Gearing class destroyers into the 2000's simply because there hadn't been enough surface vessels capable of accomodating rotorcraft. Gearing class destroyers were first launched during the 1940's.

Today, Gearing class destroyers are no longer in service with the ROKN, and the ROKN is currently operating three Gwanggaeto the Great class and six Chungmugong Yi Sun-Shin class destroyers. This summer, the first AEGIS-equipped King Sejong the Great class destroyer will be commissioned into service. The quantity of the latter two classes of destroyers are expected to increase further in the near future, and the Fast Frigate eXperimental (FFX) program is expected to yield its first vessel, equipped with a helipad, sometime shortly after 2010. In turn, the ROKN's fleet of Super Lynx will most likely grow in tandem with the aforementioned vessels. Currently, the ROKN's Super Lynx may be armed with Sea Skua anti-ship missiles, most likely for use against North Korean fast attack craft, and Cheongsangeo anti-submarine torpedoes.

According to a recent South Korean media report, the ROKN appears to be finding another innovative utility for its destroyer helipads. At the moment, the three branches of the South Korean military are in the process of selecting their own elite group of individuals to represent their service at an inter-service soccer tournament. In order to prepare for this event, the ROKN appears to be selecting their fittest even while at sea on its destroyer helipads, as pictured below. Indeed, as history of warfare has often shown, certain features of weapons platforms and systems have unintended utilities that could only be realized by end users with a creative mind.

ROKN athletes gear up to triumph over
the less fortunate (a.k.a army and air force) while at sea.

Potential Grows for PLAN Use of Burmese Ports

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China's lack of port access on the other end of the Malacca Strait appears to have found a partial solution. While belated, I recently came across a series of articles on China's port construction on Burma's Ramree Island. The port's primary purpose, at least for the time-being, appears associated with an oil pipeline that will link Ramree with South West China. With a rumored depth of 20 meters, the port is expected to be able to accomodate a range of ships, including oil tankers and destroyers.

While the individual articles provide nice background about the port development itself, an academic article published by a Japanese university provides an interesting summary of the port development's politico-strategic implications:

Myanmar is geographically located at the southwest of China and is strategically important as a ‘landridge’ for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the long term to reach the Indian Ocean via the Myanmar-controlled Coco Islands, which are about 30 km north of the Indian-controlled Andaman Islands. By the year 2050, China is expected to achieve world-class blue water navy status. Myanmar would be strategically important for China to achieve direct access to the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. The PLAN would be able to shorten the distance by 3000km reducing the voyage by five to six days by not passing through the Strait of Malacca to reach the Bay of Bengal. In 1994, Japanese sources reported that China had completed construction of radar and electronic surveillance facilities on the Coco Islands, which were on lease to China. There was also a report that China and Myanmar were interested in joint development of a deep-water port at Kyaukpyu on Ramree Islands in the Bay of Bengal. Furthermore, the alleged military installation at the Zadetkyi Island on Myanmar’s southern tip of its territory close to Indonesia’s Sabang Island, (off northern Aceh in Sumatra) raised suspicions about China’s future maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean. Thus China’s strategic alignment with and inroads into Myanmar could have long-term serious security implications not only for Indonesia, Thailand and ASEAN as a whole, but also for the long-term strategic interests of India, Japan and the US.

However, it should be noted China's increasing dependence upon foreign ports may very well increase the country's vulnerability. Simply, expansion without commensurate naval capabilities amounts to holding out an arm without a shield. And, ongoing naval developments in Asia, particularly in the United States, South Korea and Japan, do not appear to be going in China's favor in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

ADD Naval Weapons Arm to Develop UAV's?

ROKS Dokdo.

As stated publicly last year by former Defense Minister Kim Jang-Su, South Korea's Dokdo class vessels, which were initially conceived during the mid-1990's, were designed with an intention of carrying fighter jets. While the current generation of officers in the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) may see an array of utilities for the vessel type, as exemplified by the recent Korean Integrated Training Program (KITP), the future refit of Dokdo class vessels for jet aircraft accomodation is a possibility that cannot be ruled out for the time being.

In recent days, a trickle of news from the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) provided a hint regarding a possible future utility of the Dokdo class vessels. According to Yonhap News, the ADD announced this week that the new location of the 6th Technology Research Center will be constructed in Busan's Yongho-dong, a district which is also home to the Republic of Korea Navy's (ROKN) operations command. The 6th Technology Research Center is responsible for the development of naval weapons systems. The R&D facility is expected to be constructed on 59,400 square meters of real estate.

Of particular note, the media report was accompanied by an intriguing statement. Busan city officials apparently told Yonhap News that the facility is capable of housing a 200 meter long landing strip for UAV's. What else is 200 meters long? The deck of Dokdo class vessels. Certainly, considering the slim amount of publicly available information so far, linking this development with the future utility of the Dokdo class vessels is premature. Nevertheless, it is an entertaining thought.

While I have yet to come across any ADD announcements that mention the development of carrier-launched aircraft, the ADD is reportedly intent on developing medium- to high-altitude reconnaissance UAV's and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) by 2020. Their ability to operate from carriers would certainly provide a new dimension of capabilities for Dokdo class vessels. More importantly, they could also provide South Korea the ability to operate airborne platforms in theaters distant from Korean territory without the political hassles that often accompany overseas deployment of air forces. Of course, this leaves open the debate on whether "unmanned" is the practical way ahead for the future of air warfare, particularly those involving air-to-air combat.

USN, ROKN & FN PASSEX in North-East Asia

Somewhere west of the Korean peninsula, there was recently a PASSEX between the United States Navy (USN), the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) and the French Navy (FN). It is known to have gone smoothly. The participating ships were USS Stethem (DDG 63), ROKS Wang Geon (DDH 978) and FS Dupleix (D641).

The recent PASSEX is known to have been the first exercise between the three navies in quite a long time. However, with the FN having recently established its first post-colonial base in Asia, there may be more frequent sightings in the future of French ships in the region.

Below are several photos from the exercise. Beauty certainly comes in many forms.

S. Korean Submarine Programs Progress Despite Reported Glitches

ROKS Son Won-Il was commissioned into service during this ceremony in December 2007, which took place in Jinhae and was attended by the wife of the late Admiral Son Won-Il, the ROKN's founding father.

ROKS Son Won-Il during sea trials.

The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) in December 2007 commissioned into service its first U-214, ROKS Son Won-Il. A South Korean media report, however, recently stirred up controversy by claiming ROKS Son Won-Il was suffering problems with its propeller shaft. In response, the ROKN has publicly stated the U-214's were performing "superbly", and that ongoing work on ROKS Son Won-Il has been intended to maximize upon the U-214's capabilities, not to make up for glitches. Nevertheless, HDW is known to have offered South Korea a USD 5,000,000 guarantee that any faults with the ROKN's U-214 will be fixed to expected standards. A second ROKN U-214, ROKS Jeong Ji, is currently undergoing sea trial, and is expected to enter into service later this year. By 2018, the ROKN is expected to possess nine U-214's, while its existing batch of nine U-209's, most of which were built during the 1990's, are expected to commence retirement beginning sometime during the 2010's.

Next in line for the ROKN's growing submarine force? A 3,000-ton boat currently being pursued under the KSS-III program. The program is still known to be in its conception and design phase. Unlike the KSS-I (U-209) and the KSS-II (U-214) programs, the KSS-III program is expected to be an indigenous program whose primary contractors are both Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) and Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI). Foreign participation in the program is expected, but the foreign contractor has yet to be selected.

A bureau for the KSS-III program was "officially" set up in February 2008, and the design phase is expected to be completed by the end of 2011. For now, the program is expected to yield a total of three submarines, and arguments stemming from South Korea's "blue-water" school indicate the three submarines will be used as escorts for Dokdo-class aircraft carriers. Technical details under consideration have not been publicized. However, there does exist an allegedly rejected design for KSS-III, a collaboration between HDW and DSME, which was recently made public in a South Korean publication.

Greek U-214 Growing Mussels

HNS Papanikolis on drydock.

The Hellenic Navy has apparently been suffering a number of technical issues with its first U-214, HNS Papanikolis, from Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW). However, that's no justification to treat a submarine as beautiful as the U-214 as an aquarium for mussels and other marine organisms, as reported by a German media outlet and pictured above. For the sake of my Greek friends, I hope the Greek government gets the situation straightened out.

A Sad Kilo-Class Submarine

Several photos of a Russian Kilo-class submarine are on display at the website of Yoo Yong-Won, the Chosun Ilbo's defense correspondent. The photos capture the very essence of the oxymoron that is Russian sea power.

Sometime during the 1990's, the Russian government was trying to sell South Korea Kilo-class submarines. So, the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) sent some of its officers to Russian navy bases and shipyards. According to one officer's account, as described in his recently published memoir, the visits were nothing short of "jaw-dropping" shock. His descriptions were pretty much in line with the photos below:

USN-ROKN to Pursue Joint Operations in Indian Ocean

ROKS Chungmugong Yi Sun-Shin (KD2) refuels during its round-the-world tour in 2007.

The Republic of Korea Navy’s (ROKN) pursuit of an ocean-going strategy is publicly known, and calls from outside the ROKN for the construction of three carrier battle groups should be common knowledge for East Asian naval experts. In order to pursue this strategy, the ROKN has been engaged in a rapid modernization and buildup program that has lasted roughly two decades, consisting of a wide range of ships such as the three classes of KDX destroyers, KSS-II (U214) submarines and LPX vessels. In the future, planned programs include FFX frigates and KSX 3,000-ton submarines. However, the question remains: when will the ROKN’s surface vessels begin operations outside of coastal waters? A South Korean media report claims the day may be fast approaching.

According to a media report citing an anonymous South Korean defense official, the United States Navy (USN) has reportedly suggested a need for the USN and ROKN to establish and increase naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean through the conduct of joint operations aimed at tackling seaborne threats, such as piracy, in order to safeguard civilian vessels from both countries.

As an initial step in this process, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff has announced that the ROKN has for the first time stationed one of its commanders at the US 5th Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, discussions for which had begun in mid-2007 while the South Korean government was in hostage talks around Somalia for the release of South Korean hostages. The purpose of his/her stationing is reportedly to increase USN-ROKN cooperation, as well as to begin the process of forming a USN-ROKN joint operations structure. In addition to initiatives in Bahrain, the USN will reportedly take part in the training of the ROKN in the conduct of expeditionary operations. The ROKN is one of over 20 navies that has an officer stationed with the US 5th Fleet.

With regards to South Korean rationale behind accepting the USN’s offer, a media report quoted a South Korean defense official as saying, “South Korea’s national power has increased, and it is apparent there has been an escalation of threats from pirates against fishing vessels operating overseas in areas such as the coast of Somalia.... This measure was decided upon in order to expand the structure of the US-ROK alliance, and to provide greater safety for our citizens.”

The above statement is certainly new in an important way. The positive verb usually attached to the US-ROK alliance has been “strengthen,” while the concept of “expanding” the alliance, suggestive of tackling non-North Korean threats and involving power projection, is something I have yet to find in statements made by South Korean officials. Certainly, the US-ROK alliance has “expanded” in recent years with South Korean troop deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the word used to describe the purpose of such overseas deployments has usually been “strengthen." The use of "expand," I believe, is an indication, albeit a minor one for now, that South Korea's changing defense policy is increasingly obviated as the country's growing naval capabilities increasingly permit.

At a time when ringing alarm bells over the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has become modish, it is important to note that the ROKN’s ocean-going strategy appears to be playing out under the aegis (no pun intended) of a US-ROK alliance whose naval dimension will hopefully move well beyond the North Korean threat and into distant waters. In terms of capability, the ROKN should be able to afford to take part in distant operations in the near-term within an alliance or coalition setting.

As for the level of popular support behind the ROKN's future expeditionary operations in tandem with the USN, I would imagine the South Korean public to be either supportive or neutral. Acts of piracy against South Korean vessels and civilians have been growing in recent years with such attacks occurring anywhere between the coast of Nigeria and Somalia to the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. In hostage-taking crises over the past two years, sections of the South Korean public have been vocal in calling for the establishment of South Korean military capability to protect and rescue South Korean vessels and civilians. Of course, the only branch of the military capable of carrying out such operations would be the navy, and the ROKN's future expeditionary accomplishments will no doubt stir up patriotism. Equally important, such operations will also instill a new breed of purpose behind the US-ROK alliance amongst the South Korean public. The alliance may have been forged in blood and gratitude. However, national interest will become the undisputed dominant undercurrent driving the alliance over the next few decades, which should serve as a trust-worthy guarantor for the health of the alliance considering the political circles in both Washington and Seoul are dominated by those of the post-Korean War generation.

LPX Dokdo Leads US-ROK Exercise

For the first time in history, the South Korean military last month took the command role in an exercise with its American ally. Of particular note, the amphibious landing exercise in mid-November saw South Korea's first aircraft carrier, the LPX Dokdo, as the exercise's command vessel with the landing force operation center (LFOC) on board.

The LPX Dokdo entered service over the summer, and it has already made a significant impact. As evidenced in the recent US-ROK exercise, the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) is now capable of launching amphibious assaults from over the horizon, commanding and overseeing an operation of impressive scale. According to the Chosun Ilbo, the LPX Dokdo oversaw from 4km off the coast of Gyeongsang Province approximately 77 landing tanks, 60 aircraft, and 8,000 soldiers, as well as 20 surface vessels, including the US Navy's USS Essex, USS Juneau and the ROKN's KDX-II Yi Sun-Shin class destroyers.

While the LPX Dokdo may be instrumental in a potential war against North Korea, the aircraft carrier appears to have been conceived with a wider array of operations in mind as apparent in the English-language words inscribed along the top of the LPX Dokdo's logo: project power.

Seawolf's 'Sudden' Visit to S. Korea

The USS Connecticut recently became the first Seawolf class attack submarine to visit South Korea. During the eight-day visit, the USS Connecticut went through maintenance work while docked in the Republic of Korea Navy's (ROKN) Yongho-dong base in Busan. American submariners also invited onboard ROKN submarine warfare officers for a tour of the Seawolf.

The Chosun Ilbo has described the nature of the visit as "sudden," and questions have been brewing in South Korea as to the reasons behind the Seawolf's "sudden" visit with some South Korean military officials hinting the United States may have wanted to send a signal to China. That South Korea would welcome the Seawolf despite such interpretation is something that shouldn't be easily ignored. Indeed, reasons greater than North Korea do exist for the US-ROK alliance.

Russian Hurdles to Vietnam's Naval Modernization?

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A rising economic star of East Asia, Vietnam is known to be seeking enhanced naval capabilities. The Vietnam People's Navy (VPN) is known to be seeking capabilities to better defend its coastal waters as well as to stake its claim on the disputed Paracel and Sptratly Islands where Vietnamese civilian vessels have been targeted by the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in recent years. Over the summer, a PLAN ship sunk a Vietnamese vessel while a VPN BPS-500 fast attack vessel apparently remained at bay due to concerns about confronting the PLAN ship's reportedly superior firepower. The Vietnamese defense establishment responded by citing the need to strengthen the VPN's capabilities.

Despite their ongoing efforts to upgrade their retrograde fleet, a major hurdle for the VPN in the near term will be that its fleet is mostly comprised of Russian naval vessels and weapons systems, including those listed in recent orders. Among others, Russian electronic equipment and radar systems are known to be quite inferior compared to American and European systems, which are operated by a number of other East Asian navies. While this may not prove to be such a grave issue against the ill-equipped PLAN, it will certainly be the case against the likes of the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) which have access to the European naval weapons market. For instance, the RMN is currently in possession of the BAE System's FFG 29/30 Leiku Class frigates and Howaldswerke Deutsche Werft's (HDW) FS 1500 Kasturi Class corvettes. Malaysia, like Vietnam and China, claims the Spratlys as its own.

Of course, this isn't to deny the issue of manpower quality in the aforementioned navies. Nevertheless, the importance of weapons, though not the single most important issue, cannot be ignored.

With relations on the upswing between the United States and Vietnam, as exemplified by the US Navy's (USN) recent port visit to a northern Vietnamese city, it may be in VPN's interests to seek naval weapons from Western markets, as well as Western-based weapons systems from the likes of South Korea. Publicly information suggests that has yet to happen. However, available information indicates the VPN's most recent order was for four Russian frigates.

Progress in S. Korean & Japanese Carrier Programs

Will China acquire an aircraft carrier? While many observers ponder this question, China's neighboring navies appear to be making greater strides in this area.

Over the past few years, South Korea and Japan have constructed naval vessels that could be refitted into light aircraft carriers capable of accomodating VSTOL (vertical short takeoff landing) aircraft that most predict will be the F-35B. Details about both countries' carrier aspirations were noted in a previous blog entry titled, "Experts Suggest Islands Dispute Require VSTOL Aircraft" (do read that post before reading further, as this post is its continuation).

Over the summer, there have been some concrete developments, not mere chatter, in both countries' carrier programs. Having conducted sea trials over the past year, the Republic of Korea Navy's (ROKN) first LPX class vessel, the Dokdo, was commissioned for service this summer. Meanwhile, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) recently celebrated the launch of the first DDH Hyuga class vessel, the Hyuga.

Both vessels are the two largest naval vessels in North-East Asia with displacements ranging between 13,000 and 14,000 tons, and can accomodate around 13 rotorcraft.

In public, officials from both countries have denied possession of an "aircraft carrier" by leaning on the flexibility of the terminology's definition. So far, the carrier label has been fended off using two reasons. First, the two vessels do not currently carry fighter jets nor have plans for their use been made public. Second, they couldn't be classified as aircraft carriers, because they pale in size compared to 100,000 ton Nimitz-class vessels that seem to constitute the popular definition of an aircraft carrier.

However, as noted in a previous entry, there are indications both countries desire VSTOL accomodation. With regards to the ROKN, the indications are apparent in publicly available open source information about ROKN activity. The ROKN and Hanjin Heavy Industries, the lead contractor for the LPX program, have both made separate inquiries to overseas engineering companies about the possibility of refitting LPX class vessels to accomodate VSTOL aircraft. Additionally, a recent ROKN promotional video includes animation clips showing the future ROKN highlighted by VSTOL aircraft taking off from a vessel that appears strikingly similar to the Dokdo.

As for the JMSDF, the indications are closely linked to arguments made by experts who cite Japanese political intentions and operational requirements for power projection to the vicinity of the South China Sea. Arguments have been presented for Japan's need for carriers accomodating VSTOL aircraft, as the JMSDF is tasked with defending maritime territory that is far larger than its land mass, and includes the Ryukyu island chain which some Japanese fear may be targeted for invasion from China. Of equal importance, the JMSDF will most likely operate against the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and quite possibly the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), in case of China's Taiwan invasion attempt. Power projection with smaller, faster and more numerous (i.e. less vulnerable) carrier assets may turn out to be a necessity, depending on American decision to participate in Taiwan's defense, as well as American commitment to the effort.

Taiwan to Construct Spratly Air Base

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Following announcements made in 2005, the sovereign government of Taiwan has once again made public their desire to construct an airfield on Itu Aba island which is better known as a part of the energy resource-laiden Spratly Islands. Below is an overview, courtesy of the Yomiuri Shimbun:

Taiwan is building a military airfield on Itu Aba Island, the largest among the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, a Taiwan Defense Ministry official told The Yomiuri Shimbun on Wednesday.

Taiwan has claimed sovereignty over the Spratlys, a string of oil-rich rocky outcrops, along with China, Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries.

Planned to be used by C-130 transport planes and other aircraft, the completion of the airfield is expected to cement Taiwan's effective control of the island, observers said.

Covering an area of about 0.48 square kilometer, Itu Aba is the only Spratly island under Taiwan's control.

The 1,150-meter-long, 30-meter-wide runway is scheduled to be completed by the end of this year, with a total construction cost of about 700 million new Taiwan dollars (about U.S.21 million dollars). Currently, Taiwan's coast guard mainly takes charge of the island's defense.

The airfield is expected to help Taiwan permanently control the territory and will be utilized in relief activities, the Defense Ministry official said.

The coast guard administration plans to use the runway as a road, but military forces would take control of it in an emergency, he added.

The Spratly Islands are also claimed by China, Malaysia, Phillipinnes and Vietnam as their own. The Chinese government's response has yet to be mentioned by the English-language media. However, Vietnam has made its discontent known about Taiwan's activities on dao Ba Binh:

"Vietnam possesses adequate historical evidence and legal foundations to proclaim its sovereignty over the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagoes," said Vietnam's Foreign Ministry spokesman Le Dung.

"All activities in the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes which are not approved by Vietnam are violations of Vietnam's sovereignty in these areas and are devoid of legal merit," he said in a statement sent to AFP Thursday.

Dung said Vietnam "urges Taiwan to immediately desist from continuing with its plan as well as similar activities in the Truong Sa archipelago."

Sneakpeak at Japan's 5th Generation Fighter Program

Will Japan be able to purchase the F-22? Despite expecting to cost $300 million each (and, that's excluding maintenance costs), the answer to this question hinges more so on politics than on economics. In turn, should the United States Congress maintain the status quo with regards to the export of F-22's, what is Japan to do?

There have been murmurs of Japan's own "indigenous" fifth generation fighter jet program in the works. While I'm unaware of the details, below are some photos courtesy of Yoo Yong-won's resourceful website:

Climate Change & North-East Asia's Force Structure

How big a challenge is climate change to military establishments in North-East Asia? While close friends of mine may be quite surprised to hear, my opinion is that climate change may be a greater concern for the United States and its North-East Asian allies than China's military modernization.

Losing the likes of fertile land, clean water supplies and entire cities to the effects of climate change may bring about instability, and possibly anarchy, at a scale not experienced in recent years by North-East Asia's economically affluent countries of South Korea and Japan, as well as those in the European Union.

More specifically, most of East Asia's major metropolises are situated along or near the coast. After all, with over 90% of world's trade happening at sea (yes, even today), it is inevitable that centers of economy be located within close proximity of port facilities. Should such cities drown (Beijing and Shanghai are expected to disappear), the economic effects would be beyond the human imagination, and the resulting mass migration could very well devastate the economic and social stability of neighboring countries.

While it is important that politicians across the globe take action to prevent or delay such events, militaries should be better prepared to respond to the disasters, whether it is to help their own respective population (and learn the lessons of Katrina) or to cope with and assist large flows of migrants seeking shelter. Certainly, the likes of South Korea and Japan need sea-based heavy lifting capability from light aircraft carriers, as well as the training of greater number of ground troops to conduct stability operations and other military missions that largely fit under the rubric of Sir Rupert Smith's "war amongst the people."

In addition, South Korea and Japan stand as two of the world's five largest oil importers, along with China and the US. With their obvious and understandable attention on improving their respective naval and air capabilities, the armed forces of both countries must plan to utilize alternative energy sources which are of a more environmentally friendly variety. As years pass and competition for traditional energy resources heat up to unprecedented heights, it will become increasingly risky to depend on oil for the training and conduct of naval and air operations, which could very well handicap power projection and dilute the two countries' respective force gradient. After all, the global oil consumption today stands at 85 million barrels per day. Should China realize its potential as an economic super power, China alone is expected to consume 90 million barrels on a DAILY basis.

Seoul and Tokyo certainly have much to worry about, and China is of tremendous concern for both countries. Indeed, the two countries' ongoing military reform, modernization and buildup are largely motivated by the unclear implications of China's economic and military ascendance. While preparing for conventional warfare of all scales is crucial for both countries, the threat of climate change must be addressed, and their militaries must be prepared. This certainly will not be an easy task for either country, and far more difficult when compared to major European militaries, none of whom have state-to-state threats in their home region.

With China emerging as its foremost concern, South Korea has devoted and plans to spend far more cash on developing and acquiring the likes of 5th generation fighter jets, air-refuelling tankers, and an array of naval vessels, while kickstarting its own rotorcraft program with the help of Eurocopter. The positive side is that many of these platforms may prove useful in dealing with the effects of climate change. However, in order to prepare for stability missions, South Korea would have to train greater number of its ground troops to undertake "softer" missions, which may dilute the country's focus on conventional warfare vis-a-vis China and North Korea. Meanwhile, the Japanese simply need a far larger number of ground troops, which would require revising the Pacifist Constitution. That in itself is a handful for the Japanese.

Just to clarify, I am by no means opposing either country's military buildup. In fact, I support them. My point is that the two countries need to prepare for another potential major threat that would need to be addressed in a far different manner and require different array of military capabilities.

While I am still gaining my footing with regards to the question of military preparedness for the effects of climate change, the clever folks over at the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) in Virginia have published a very intriguing report titled, "National Security and the Threat of Climate Change," which is authored by CNA's Military Advisory Board ("Board") that consists exclusively of retired admirals and generals. Their message appears to be that climate change is not simply a '"soft" issue for activists, but a matter of national security and national interest. I couldn't agree more. As one of the Board members said, "It’s not hard to make the connection between climate change and instability, or climate change and terrorism.”

Below are the Board's overall threat perception with regards to climate change:

1. Projected climate change poses a serious threat to America’s national security Climate change acts as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.
2. Projected climate change will add to tensions even in stable regions of the world Climate change, national security, and energy dependence are a related set of global challenges.

Below are the Board's recommendations:

1. The national security consequences of climate change should be fully integrated into national security and national defense strategies.
2. The U.S. should commit to a stronger national and international role to help stabilize climate change at levels that will avoid significant disruption to global security and stability.
3. The U.S. should commit to global partnerships that help less developed nations build the capacity and resiliency to better manage climate impacts.
4. The Department of Defense should enhance its operational capability by accelerating the adoption of improved business processes and innovative technologies that result in improved U.S. combat power through energy efficiency.
5. The Department of Defense should conduct an assessment of the impact on U.S. military installations worldwide of rising sea levels, extreme weather events, and other projected climate change impacts over the next 30 to 40 years.

For more, please refer to the report which is available in PDF format.

Studies on Potential LNG Tanker Attack Released

Maritime terrorism is largely feared due to the impact it would have on the international economy. After all, only one torched ship at the mouth of a port or somewhere near a chokepoint is all that is needed to create a jam, which in turn would delay oil shipments to one or more developed countries. And, it should be noted that incredibly few wealthy countries have large pools of oil reserves to last several days without a steady supply of energy imports.

But, can maritime terrorism physically affect those on land? According to a recent study by the United States Government Accounting Office (GAO), 'tis possible.

One ship type that has been reputed as a lucrative target of maritime terrorism has been liquified natural gas (LNG) tankers. According to the GAO study, a LNG tanker can be used to not only affect sea commerce, but also harm people one mile away from the ship. In other words, if a LNG tanker is "weaponized" near or at port, it could become a terribly frightening instrument. Here's an excerpt from an Associated Press story:

Fire from a terrorism attack against a tanker ship carrying liquefied natural gas could ignite so fiercely it would burn people one mile away, according to a congressional study.

...

The study by the Government Accountability Office was expected to be released Wednesday. It urged the Energy Department to perform new research on the risks from a major fire or gas release in terror attacks or natural disasters on such tanker ships.

...

The GAO report examined six unclassified studies about the effects of a major spill and fire aboard a double-hulled tanker carrying liquified natural gas. Congressional investigators said most experts believe fierce heat from the intense fire -- not explosions -- are likely the biggest threat to citizens.

Most experts interviewed by investigators agreed such a fire could burn people's skin roughly one mile away, depending on variables that include the amount of gas released, size of the tanker breach and winds, the GAO report said.....

If you'd like to read the GAO report in entirety, click here.

South Korean Type 214 Completes First Trial

South Korea's ongoing naval buildup is somewhat eased by the country's possession of the world's most vibrtant shipbuilding industry which commands around 40% of the global market. While surface vessels may be their forte, one of the industry's greatest achievements, and contributions to the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN), may be Hyundai Heavy Industries' (HHI) licensed construction of Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft's (HDW) Type 214 attack submarines.

Powered by fuel cell batteries and equipped with air independent propulsion (AIP) system, the U214's have been considered to be the most quiet attack submarines worldwide that can remain submerged for several weeks at a time. Coupled with ROKN strength in submarine warfare manpower, it certainly wouldn't be an exaggeration to claim the ROKN's U214 may be amongst the most lethal attack submarines in Asia.

The construction of HHI's first U214, the Sohn Won-Il (손원일함), was celebrated last June. The submarine, named after the ROKN's founder, recently returned from its first trial at sea. According to media reports, the five-day trial was successful. If all go as planned, the Sohn Won-Il should be commissioned for service in the ROKN by November.

The U214's are expected to play a crucial role in ROKN efforts to extend its reach by 2020 to the northern Philippines. In 2005, the Ministry of National Defense made an abrupt change in the ROKN's acquisition plans by tripling the number of U214's. In turn, the ROKN is expected to possess a total of nine U214's by 2018, which will be in addition to the existing nine U209's. The U209's are manufactured by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME), also under license from HDW.

Republic of Korea Navy to Search for Turtle Ships

With the assistance of private sponsors, the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) has announced a three-year project to find remnants of the Imjin Waeran-era Geobukseon, or the Turtle Ship, in waters around Geoje Island (거제도). This project is important from a naval history standpoint for a number of reasons, one of which is to clear up the exact shapes of the different Turtle Ships used during the Imjin Waeran (1592-98).

First constructed for service in 1591, the Turtle Ship’s role was to sink enemy commanders' ships that were usually located at the back end of the enemy formation. The Turtle Ship was most ideal to sail through a large portion of an enemy fleet, since its spiked armor made the ship nearly impossible to board and its walls were too thick for Japanese anti-personnel weapons to penetrate. It should be noted that the Japanese navy, unlike the Chosun Navy, didn't possess any "ship-sinking" weapons on board. When the Turtle Ship reached the vicinity of Japanese commanders' Adake-class ships, it would sink the enemy vessels using their naval gunnery.

A maximum of three such Turtle Ships participated in the war effort, and each one is known to have belonged to a different naval base along the southern coast. In addition, the appearances of the ships are known to have been different from one another. A major difference is known to be in the position of the dragon head. Apparently, at least one of the three ships fired guns from the mouth of the dragon head. Popular designs of the Turtle Ship show the dragon head protruded from the body and elevated. However, it would be practically impossible for the ship’s crew to fire multiple shots from an elevated dragon head. Take a look at this photo of a Turtle Ship, and imagine how the three or four crew members required for each gun could clean and reload the gun while the ship was charging ahead.

Unless the crew had rock-climbing gear, doing so would have been an impossible feat. In all likelihood, the Turtle Ship that fired from the mouth had a noticeable difference from the popular design. As one historical record shows, at least one Turtle Ship used during the Imjin Waeran had a head that simply protruded and did not elevate at all.

Could a gun be used inside such a dragon head?

The Chosun Navy’s capital ship during the war was the Panokseon which was first built in 1555, almost 40 years before the war’s outbreak. The Turtle Ship, first constructed for service in 1591, is basically a Panokseon with a cover. As a result, both ships used similar oars, guns were placed in very similar spots around the ship and both ships had three levels, or floors. In turn, the interior of the Turtle Ship in all likelihood looked quite similar to the top floor of the Panokseon, which looked like this:

Assuming that the Turtle Ship and the Panokseon had very similar interiors, I would think the Turtle Ship with the gun-firing mouth did not require additional features to fire out of the dragon head’s mouth. Inside the ship, the gun in the mouth looked and worked no differently than any other gun. The only difference was that it simply fired out of a hole that had a rather large mask in the form of a dragon head.

I certainly hope a large enough portion of this Turtle Ship variant is recovered to clear up the mystery. After all, it may not have been the Turtle Ships familiar to us that actually did the job.

Airborne PAC-3's Under Study

Lockheed Martin is reportedly going to study the idea of firing Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles from F-15's, variants of which are in service for the United States' two major East Asian allies, South Korea and Japan.

The advantage of airborne PAC-3's, according to UPI, would be their ability to reach their targets faster than those that are land-based:

Although the initial $ 3 million funding for the research program is small by the expensive R and D budgets of the BMD programs, its implications could be far reaching. The program is known as the Air-Launched Hit-to-Kill, or ALHTK, initiative. If successful, the program would eventually see U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft equipped with PAC-3s that they could air launch. The speed and range of the F-15s would carry the PAC-3s far closer to their targets than was previously imagined possible and give them a boost of up to around 1,500 miles per hour, or faster than Mach 2, significantly improving their performance and the likelihood that they could intercept and destroy incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Why is velocity important? According to physicists I've talked to, existing missile defense systems are only lethal during the 30-45 minute boost phase when the targeted missiles emit most heat. However, the problem has been that the detection of a ballistic missile launch isn't immediate, and by the time a friendly missile reaches the target's vicinity, the targeted missile is beyond the boost phase, after which ballistic missiles are supposedly pretty much impossible to hit.

Nigerian Pirates Murder & Loot Aboard S. Korean Ship

Only two days after a group of South Korean hostages were freed by a Nigerian non-state group, pirates boarded and looted a ship registered to Hyundai Construction around the same area where the kidnapping took place last week. The pirates apparently opened fire at the passengers upon boarding, and took their personal belongings. No kidnapping is known to have taken place. Majority of the passengers, mostly non-locals, were shot. Two are known to be dead, and several others are in critical condition. 16 pirates are known to have been involved in the attacks, using two vessels.

There are nearly 1,000 South Koreans living in the oil-rich Niger Delta, most of whom are employees of South Korean energy and construction companies.

China Rejects N. Korean Request for J-10 Fighter Jets

North Korea has reportedly expressed interest in acquiring China's 4th generation Jian-10 (J-10) fighter jets. Quoting a Chinese report, several South Korean newspapers have claimed North Korean representatives at the recent round of six-party talks had inquired their Chinese counterparts about acquiring the J-10, which China has allegedly refused.

Meanwhile, since Beijing publicly unveiled the J-10 earlier this month, it has been receiving noticeable media coverage in South Korea. And, it appears South Koreans aren't too happy about it, and understandably so.

(HatTip to Sunho Beck)

Experts Suggest Islands Dispute Require VSTOL Aircraft

A few experts in Australia and Japan are suggesting needs for vertical short take-off and landing (VSTOL) aircraft on the basis of expected problems associated with the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Should VSTOL aircraft, such as the F-35 Lightning II, be acquired, that would mean a greater role and rationale for power projection for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). More significantly, Japanese acquisition of VSTOL aircraft would mean that Asia's most capable navy would be acquiring carriers, albeit probably light carriers, most likely angering China and possibly speeding up Beijing's anticipated acquisition of similar surface vessels.

The Australian argument for VSTOL aircraft, provided by the Kokoda Foundation, stem partly from Australia's possible participation in a contingency where "a regional power occupies disputed islands in North East Asia." In all likelihood, the "disputed islands" are those amongst Japan's Ryukyu Islands which include the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. A number of Asia watchers estimate those islands, whose surrounding seabed stores energy reserves, to be a potential cause for armed conflict between Japan and China.

Meanwhile, a Japanese expert has suggested Japan's need for VSTOL aircraft, specifically stating the need to protect some of the islets in the Ryukyus from Chinese invasion. In Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes' article from last summer's issue of the Naval War College Review, the two American academics pointed out a certain Japanese report:

In policy terms, the Japanese government has responded concretely to the potential Chinese challenge. Reflecting worries about Beijing’s intentions toward the offshore islands, the latest defense white paper sets the capacity to stage an effective response to island invasion as a major priority.

Significantly, the report states, “If there is an indication noticed in advance, an operation shall be conducted to prevent invasion by the enemy’s unit. If there is no indication in advance and the islands in question were occupied, an operation shall be conducted to defeat the enemy." For the first time, the Ground SDF forces recently joined the U.S. Marine Corps in joint and combined exercises to defend offshore islands. The Maritime Self-Defense Force would play a central role in carrying ground troops in such a defensive operation. The JMSDF has also engaged in antisubmarine drills with the U.S. Navy near Okinawan waters.

A recent study considers how the SDF’s capabilities would measure up against China’s military in combat over Japan’s offshore islands. The study postulates that if the Chinese side were able to surprise Japan and rapidly occupy the Sakishima Islands, the SDF would find it difficult if not impossible to dislodge enemy forces on its own. Given the short distances involved, land-based Chinese fighter aircraft could easily provide protective cover against Japanese forces, while Japanese aircraft would have much shorter loiter times in the area. The author of the study concludes that a light aircraft carrier capable of handling vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft would be required to counter such an invasion. Regardless of whether this analysis carries any policy weight, the bluntness with which it discusses a Sino-Japanese confrontation hints at changes in the public mood in Japan with regard to a Chinese maritime challenge.

On a related note, VSTOL aircraft may also be in consideration in South Korea, and the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) has admitted interest in acquiring the F-35 Lightning II, a VSTOL version of which may be available. The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) currently possesses the LPX Dokdo which is popularly termed an "amphibious landing ship." However, the Dokdo can be refitted into a light carrier for VSTOL aircraft. According to a South Korean government advisor I spoke to recently, the ROKN requested an aircraft carrier to the Blue House a few years ago but was rejected. The person didn't specify the ROKN's rationale. Nevertheless, there are several more LPX class ships expected to be produced by Hanjin Heavy Industries for the ROKN, and separate studies were commissioned by the ROKN and Hanjin a few years ago on the possibility of turning a LPX class ship into a light carrier.

(I would like to thank Sunho Beck, since much of this entry is based on information and sources he has provided through the comments section of this blog.)

'Economist' Ponders China's Blue-Water Rationale

"All the world knows, gentlemen, that we are building a new navy.... Well, when we get our navy, what are we going to do with it?"

- Alfred Thayer Mahan

Mahan pronounced those words sometime during the late 19th century to his disciples at the US Naval War College. Today, a similar question lingers in the heads of those who often ponder about China's ongoing naval buildup. While there is no guarantee China can go blue-water, one should still inquire the motivations behind China's naval aspirations and how China's behavior may change once it has a blue-water navy.

For the general public in the English-speaking world, the major media outlets are the dominant source of information on the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Of them, the Economist ranks as the undisputed cream of the cream. And, in its first edition of 2007, the Economist gave what it believes are the reasons behind China's blue-water aspirations. They include the concentration of China's economic growth in coastal areas and the need to protect China's expanding overseas interests. Another factor, says the Economist, is prestige:

So why is Mr Hu, who has been commander-in-chief since 2004, so keen on a bigger navy? Prestige could well be part of it. Chinese state-run television aired (twice, in November and December) an unusual documentary series called “The Rise of Great Nations”. It described, with a remarkable lack of the usual anti-Western tone, how Japan and various Western countries including America and Britain became strong. Naval power was a vital ingredient, the programmes suggested.

If you're laughing, I caution you not to dismiss this suggestion lightly. History has shown examples of prestige clouding the minds of naval planners, at times leading to the construction of vessels and a navy unsuited for their national foreign policy. One problem has been worshipping Mahan, and considering his vision to be the path to naval stardom. Chinese should take caution. Unlike the days of Mao when Mahan was allegedly despised as an imperialist, today's Chinese naval experts are reportedly speaking admirably of Mahan in the public domain while applying some of his thinking to the PLAN. With the US Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) prioritizing China as their foremost concern, Beijing should be cautious how it tries to achieve its blue-water dream. As one German Mahanian (pictured below) and a slew of his inter-war era descendants discovered, it's rather difficult when a "stronger" naval power is nearby and considers your naval aspirations as a top national security concern. And, it doesn't get much easier when you're a continental country and the potential adversary with a "stronger" navy is an island nation located between your country and an ocean that is the sole approach to your shores for another, much larger country of concern.

(HatTip to Sunho Beck)

US-Japan Naval Exercise Raise Brows

Media reports claim the United States Navy (USN) and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) may have conducted a rather large naval exercise near Chinese waters simulating an allied reclaim of the Senkaku/Diaoyu island from a Chinese invasion. The exercise, titled Annualex 18G, reportedly involved a US carrier group. Tokyo denies the exercise was carried out with such specific intentions.

If the accusations are true, the exercise for the disputed island would be in addition to Iron Fist which took place last January along the American west coast. The objective of Iron Fist was for US Marines to train Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) personnel from the Western Army, which is responsible for the Ryukyu Islands, to take back a "small" island occupied by unfriendly forces. Senkaku/Diaoyu, at least according to the Japanese government, is part of the Ryukyu Islands and would fall under the responsibility of the Western Army.

Photos from Portsmouth

Below is a mini-gallery of photos from my recent visit to Portsmouth, the Royal Navy's home:

HMS Illustrious, a Royal Navy aircraft carrier.

(from left to right) HMS Illustrious, HMS Ark Royal and a Royal Navy destroyer

Yours truly standing next to a retired Polaris, the submarine-launched "nucular" ballistic missile.

A Royal Navy tomahawk cruise missile

The Polaris' warhead without the nuclear payload

HMS Victory, Admiral Horatio Nelson's ship during the Battle of Trafalgar

Malacca Strait Insecurity: Whose Fault Is It?

Pirates aren't the only problem in securing the Malacca Strait. Mark Valencia, a well-known maritime affairs expert, argued recently in an op-ed piece that tensions between the littoral states (i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia) and the major user states (e.g. the United States and Japan) have created an unattractive situation.

To sum up, the littoral states have prioritized sovereignty and hope for indirect assistance from the major users (i.e. they oppose American or Japanese naval presence in the Strait). In turn, they're asking for indirect support, such as provision of equipment for use by the Malaysian and Indonesian forces. However, user states, aside from Japan and China, haven't been too keen to cough up the dough or hardware. Whether this is due to a lack of faith in the littoral maritime forces, I don't know.

In general, Valencia points out most user states have been rather uncooperative. One might ask, isn't the Strait the responsibility of the littoral states anyway, especially considering their sensitivity about their own territorial sovereignty? Not exactly. Majority of the concerned user states are required by international law, to which they agreed, to cooperate with the littoral states:

Article 43 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which all involved have ratified except for the United States...provides that in such Straits used for international navigation user states and littoral states should cooperate in the establishment and maintenance of necessary navigational and safety aids and in the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships.

Apparently, this isn't happening. And, the littoral states aren't receiving help from another genre of users, namely the shipping companies whose lifelines depend on the Malacca Strait.

TV Dramas to Remedy S. Korea's Security Concern?